Tuesday, May 19, 2015

Xia Xueluan and Zhang Qianfan, 2015.05.19

Xia Xueluan is a professor of Sociology at Peking University
1, The unbalance of social psychology during transformation is because of the reality of the increasingly sharp social contradiction. Compared to the overall poverty during planned economy, market economy leads to huge gap between the rich and the poor, which is intolerable for those who were used to live in planned economy. They have felt this unprecedented loss. This is the loss from planned economy to market economy, from an organized society to anarchism. Those who have never experienced this kind of transformation can’t really understand this kind of social psychological unbalance.
1, 转型期的社会心理失衡是由转型期日益突出的尖锐社会矛盾现实所决定的。相比计划经济时代的普遍贫困,市场经济导致了贫富悬殊、两极分化。这是习惯在计划经济条件下生活的人所不能容忍的,他们感到从来没有过的失落。这是从计划体制到市场体制的失落,是从组织社会到无政府状态的失落。这种社会心理失衡是没有经历过这种变革的人所无法体会的。

2, The arrangement of social structure, system stratification, job opportunities and social mobility could all cause anxiety and become the source of anxiety. To be more specific, residency, housing, education, social insurance, health insurance, wealth, employment and consumption could all become the focus of social psychological anxiety.
2, 社会的结构安排、制度分层、就业机会、社会流动等因素都可能引起人们的焦虑,成为社会焦虑产生的原因。具体来说,户口、住房、教育、社保、医保、财富、就业、消费等事项都有可能成为社会心理焦虑的焦点。

3, Since the social anxiety and psychological unbalance during transformation is mostly because of the society, it is appropriate to use some social psychology to deal with this problem. Social issues related to people’s livelihood leads to social anxiety. For example, social anxiety like huge social gap, employment difficulty, high prices and food security, real policy solutions are required to seriously change these situations.
3, 由于转型期的心理焦虑及心理失衡大多是由社会原因造成的,所以对其调适更多要用社会心理方法。民生类社会问题所引起的社会心理焦虑调适。像社会两极分化、就业难、物价高和食品安全等问题所引起的社会心理焦虑,调适方法就是用政策和制度切实解决这类社会问题或认真改善这类社会问题存在状况。

Zhang Qianfan is a professor of Law at Beijing University’s Law School

1, The control on thoughts and economics level is “soft violence”, which is how totalitarianism is different from authoritarianism. Thoughts control (ideology control) firstly controls people’s mindset and make people wholeheartedly embrace and worship power without any hard violence. This is the supreme state of authoritarian control. Economic control is to make business institutions rely on state power through public ownership. If there are any problems with ideology or speeches they will have to shoulder the possibility unemployment or other economic consequences. For example, if they published a banned book, the whole publish house will have to close and all of its employees will lose their jobs.
1, 思想和经济层面的管制则属于“软暴力”,也是极权有别于一般威权的特征。思想管制通过洗脑控制人民的思维,使之根本不用实施硬暴力就衷心拥戴政权。这是威权统治的最高境界。经济管制则是通过公有制造成对政权的经济依附,如果思想或言论出现偏差就要承担失业等经济后果,譬如说出版了一本禁书就要关闭出版社,出版社的全体工作人员都得丢饭碗。

2, I divide China’s ideology after 1949 into three phases. The first phase is the “nationwide brainwash” period in 1950s and 1960s; the second is the phase of “elites’ retrospection” since 1978, marked by the debates of standards of truth; right now we are in the “nationwide enlightenment” phase, which is largely due to the development of the Internet. Marked by the Sun Zhigang incident in 2003, since then every Netizen could reflect on history and the current situation, which hugely increases the strength of retrospection on the legitimacy of the system and criticism. It is under this backdrop that there is a new battle of ideology. Though official media has tried hard to brainwash people and the Ministry of Education has recently restressed political ideology work in university, these measures might be effective in the short term. However, in the long term it is definitely futile.

2, 我曾将1949年后的中国意识形态变化分为三个阶段。第一个是五六十年代的“全民洗脑”阶段,第二个是以1978年真理标准辩论为标志的“精英反思”阶段,现在则已进入“全民觉醒”阶段。主要是因为互联网的发展,以2003年的孙志刚事件为标志,每个网民都有条件对历史和现状进行反思,极大加大了对制度合法性的反思和批判力度。正是在这种背景下,上演着一场新的意识形态战争,官媒先后出现了夺回意识形态上的“上甘岭”、对宪政民主思想进行“亮剑”等极左话语,教育部重新强调高校政治思想工作。这些措施可能会有点一时之效,但长远来看肯定是无用功。

3, Compared to outside the system, the conditions within the system (for systematic political reform) are less fertile. The conditions within the system also has different phases. First, there should be the public appearance of the reformists. Also, the force of reformists should be stronger than the conservative. However, currently who are the “reformists” within the system”? This question is difficult to answer. During Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s time, there was Wen who publicly advocated the universal value. No matter it was a show or not, right now there are no people like him. Though there might be different divisions of belief within the party but they don’t really publicly announce anything, at least the outside lacks information about that. This kind of closed and secretive fights within different Party divisions do not provide any momentum for the positive transformation of the state.  
3, 和体制外相比,体制内的条件更难满足。体制内的条件也分为不同阶段。首先,要有改良派的公开存在。然后,改良派的力量还得超过保守派。但是现在,中国体制内的“改良派”是谁?这个问题就说不清楚。胡温时代,还有温家宝公开主张普世价值,不管是否作秀,现在连这样的人也没有了。即便党内有派也不公开活动,至少外界缺乏信息。这种封闭状态的派系斗争对于国家良性转型是没有作用和动力的。

4,Generally speaking, the current situation in China is that the hardliners outstand the reformists, and they also have the absolute loyalty from the military.

5, Since the past three decades of China’s reform and open up, though social forces in China have grown much stronger, but generally speaking there is still “no religion, no organization, and no consensus”. There is no element of religion in traditional Chinese culture, and Confucius generally highlights on the elite class, therefore has limited influence on the majority of people. The lack of moral resources make most people become passive onlookers, which makes it worse for the already difficult transformation in China. Chinese people’s tolerance towards grievances is higher than people of any other countries.
5, 改革三十年,中国社会力量虽然壮大了许多,但总体上仍未走出无信仰、无组织、无共识的“三无”状态。中国传统文化中没有宗教因素,儒家伦理主要限于士大夫精英阶层,对普通民众影响有限。道德资源缺失让绝大多数人都成为消极被动的“围观者”,给中国已很困难的转型雪上加霜。民众对不幸的忍受度比其它国家都高。

6, Under this background, there are three possibilities of China’s future. The first is the long-term coexistence of totalitarianism and social crisis - don’t underestimate the possibility of this scenario. China indeed is already a country of frequent crisis, and there are an increasing number of crisis on the aspects of economics, population, morality and environment. But we don’t have many reasons to believe that these crisis will overthrow the whole regime. The second is the explosion of crisis, which leads to social disorder and collapse of the regime. This prospect is worrisome. No positive fruits will come out of evil soil. Power emerged from crisis is generally worse than the previous one. The third possibility is partial dysfunction of the authoritarian government. Reformists within the system will actively consider political reform and there will be a new round of positive interaction within the system. The prospect of this possibility is the brightest, but so far we haven’t seen any clue for this one.

6, 在此背景下,中国未来的走向主要有三种可能性。第一种是集权与社会危机长期并存,不要低估这种可能性。中国确实是一个危机频仍的国家,经济、人口、伦理、环境危机越来越频发,但是如果执政党在处理过程中没有大的闪失,没有什么理由认为这些危机一定会导致翻盘。第二种是危机大爆发,社会失序、政权坍塌。这种前景令人担忧,因为恶性土壤长不出良性的果子,危机下产生的政权一般会比原来的更糟糕。第三种可能是威权局部失灵,体制内开明派主动考虑政治改革,体制内外形成新一轮良性互动。这种可能的前景最为光明,但目前还不见端倪。

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